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Payment in challenge studies from an 
economics perspective
Sandro Ambuehl  ,1 Axel Ockenfels  ,2 Alvin E. Roth  3
We largely agree with Grimwade et al’s1 
conclusion that challenge trial participants 
may ethically be paid, including for risk. 
Here, we add further arguments, clarify 
some points from the perspective of 
economics and indicate areas where 
(behavioural) economists can support the 
development of a framework for ethically 
justifiable payment. Our arguments apply 
to carefully constructed and monitored 
controlled human infection model 
(CHIM) trials that have been appropri-
ately reviewed and approved.
Participants in medical studies perform 
a service. Outside the domain of research 
participation, there is nearly universal 
agreement that workers providing a service 
should be compensated fairly, and that 
work involving more discomfort and risk 
should be compensated more generously. 
Accordingly, labour regulations impose 
floors (minimum wage laws), not caps on 
compensation. Caps, even if intended to 
protect against undue inducement, also 
raise concerns about illegal price- fixing 
that disadvantages workers. Such limits on 
payment for egg donors have successfully 
been challenged in court.i
Moreover, caps on compensation may 
harm everyone at risk of infection, not 
just potential participants. Insufficient 
compensation may impede the recruit-
ment of enough suitable subjects, for 
example, when representativeness of 
the subject sample is required. Delays in 
vaccine development not only prolong 
disruption of social, educational and 
economic activity but also lead to excess 
infections and deaths. Unlike paid CHIM 
participants, individuals exposed to such 
infection do not accept it voluntarily, are 
not compensated for it, and are unlikely 
to receive the level of medical supervi-
sion afforded to closely monitored CHIM 
participants.
Payment caps can lead to attempts to 
circumvent the regulation. For example, 
many countries that prevent payment 
for the donation of blood plasma instead 
import it from the USA where payment 
is legal—the volume of the US export 
market for plasma products approaches 
$20 billion per year.ii Similarly, restrictions 
on CHIM trial payments may lead to an 
increase in trials in countries with less 
stringent regulation.
In practice, designing markets and 
payment schemes requires attention to 
the details of implementation. Here, we 
note that increasing hourly pay by a risk- 
compensation percentage as proposed 
in the target article provides compensa-
tion proportional to risk only if the risk 
increases proportionally with the number 
of hours worked. (Some risky tasks take 
little time; imagine challenge trials to test 
bulletproof vests.) To ensure that equal 
consequences are compensated with equal 
amounts across a wide variety of studies, 
we instead recommend a three- part 
contract consisting of: (1) salary for time 
involvement that is adjusted to account 
for the amount of discomfort experi-
enced during participation, (2) insurance 
against ex post adverse outcomes and (3) 
ex ante compensation for risks that cannot 
be compensated ex post (such as death). 
Such a scheme also increases transpar-
ency about what is requested from partic-
ipants and thus contributes to high- quality 
participation decisions.
Ethical judgement of payment in CHIM 
trials is partially based on predictions about 
the effects on prospective participants’ 
behaviour and about the quality of their 
decision making. These predictions can be 
tested empirically and interpreted through 
the lens of precise models of the underlying 
motivational and cognitive mechanisms. 
Ambuehl2 for instance, employs controlled 
laboratory experiments to study whether 
participation incentives harm decision 
ii https://marketdesigner.blogspot.com/2020/05/
plasma-and-plasma-products-such-as.html.
quality. While higher incentives make 
subjects more interested in learning about 
the upsides of the transaction and less 
interested in the downsides, such effects 
can arise from rational decision making; 
they do not necessarily indicate deficient 
reasoning. Indeed, direct measurements 
of subjects’ welfare in that experiment 
indicate no negative effect of participation 
incentives across a wide variety of condi-
tions. Accordingly, this study suggests that 
limits on payments are not justified if one 
takes subjects’ own objectives as the rele-
vant normative standard.
That said, even rational decisions may 
raise ethical concerns. In fact, attentional 
mechanisms imply that high payments 
tend to disproportionately entice those 
individuals who have more difficulty 
gathering information about the risks 
(Ambuehl et al.3). Absent informed 
consent requirements, these participants 
may be more likely to regret their deci-
sion ex post
Overall, the fact that payments can alter 
and possibly interfere with good decision 
making speaks to the need for robust 
informed consent, not against making 
appropriate payments. Indeed, survey 
respondents do not object to incentives 
per se, they object to participation that is 
based on an insufficient understanding of 
the personal consequences of participa-
tion (Ambuehl and Ockenfels4). Caps on 
payment may even impede well- informed 
decision making because study participants 
perceive the payment magnitude as a signal 
of risk (Cryder et al5). Low payments will 
lead such subjects to underestimate the 
risks, and may cause them to participate in 
trials they would rather avoid.
Finally, we applaud Grimwade et al1 
for surveying both practitioners and 
members of the general population. We 
often know too little about how the 
views of professionals (both practitioners 
and advisors) compare with those of the 
populations with which they interact. 
Their finding that the general public 
does not share potential ethical concerns 
regarding payment of CHIM participants 
parallels the handful of existing surveys 
on the topic.6 7 Activities that depend 
on public participation require social 
support as well as ethical justification. 
Understanding the similarities and differ-
ences between professional and popular 
judgements can help both to assess the 
likelihood of success, and to highlight 
issues about which communication 
between professional and public audi-
ences is particularly important.
There are many potential explanations for 
divergences of judgements between ethicists 
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and the general public,8 including cognitive 
biases. For example, Ambuehl et al9 show 
that individuals tend to impose paternalistic 
restrictions on others as if they sought to 
align others’ choices with their own aspi-
rations (projective paternalism). The effect 
arises because individuals are insufficiently 
aware of differences between themselves and 
others (false consensus). It is important to be 
aware of such biases, especially among highly 
trained and privileged professionals who are 
dissimilar from the prospective study partic-
ipants they hope to enlist, and whose deci-
sions they seek to regulate. Indeed, in all areas 
where the question has been studied, experts 
such as financial advisors, CEOs, elected 
politicians and economists, as well as philoso-
phers10 and physicians11 are as susceptible to 
cognitive biases as ordinary citizens.
The current discussion about payment 
in challenge trials is important because the 
potential benefits of well- designed chal-
lenge trials that could accelerate the devel-
opment of safe and effective vaccines are 
enormous. Overall, economic research has 
shown, first, that ethical concerns over high 
payments may rely on intuitive predictions 
about behavioural effects that find little or 
no empirical support, and that the dangers 
of underpayment are at least as real as 
those of overpayment. Second, a part of the 
ethics literature attaches significantly more 
weight to concerns of undue inducement 
than the general population. Accordingly, it 
appears to us that there is sufficient public 
support for preparing for challenge trials, 
with paid participants, without a need for 
excessive ethical concern that payments 
might inadvertently become too generous 
to trial participants.
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